Judge says evidence about service was deficient and the plaintiff’s account of a previous hearing was inaccurate
VANCOUVER, B.C. — A B.C. Supreme Court associate judge has dismissed a self-represented litigant’s bid for a US $300 billion default judgment against Elon Musk and X.AI Corp., marking the fourth time the application has been rejected.
Azizollah Ghassemi filed a notice of civil claim on February 18, 2026, naming Musk and X.AI Corp. as defendants. In the claim, Ghassemi alleges he is the sole creator and owner of original intellectual property and says he collaborated with the defendants through the Grok and xAI platforms, providing original conceptual content that was incorporated into the development of Grok 4 and subsequent models.
The relief sought in the notice of civil claim includes “Total value of intellectual property: CA$293,189.6 billion” and “Monthly payments of approximately CA$26.500.”
In reasons delivered September 29, 2026, Associate Judge Shirreff noted the application was brought without notice and that Ghassemi appeared with the assistance of an interpreter while also making submissions on his own behalf. Ghassemi told the court this was his second case against Musk, having advanced an earlier proceeding a couple of years back.
The court heard the matter has already resulted in several chambers applications. On February 18, 2026, Ghassemi applied for an order waiving fees payable to the government, which was granted. On August 10, 2026, he filed a requisition seeking leave to proceed with a default judgment application on short notice to the defendants, which was dismissed. On August 11, 2026, he filed a notice of application seeking default judgment against both defendants, which was heard on August 13, 2026, and dismissed. Associate Judge Bilawich explained that the notice of civil claim had not been properly served and gave Ghassemi liberty to re-apply when he had evidence of proper service.
Ghassemi then set the same August 11 notice of application for a second hearing before Associate Judge Shirreff on August 20, 2026. Although the application had already been decided, it ended up on the court list. The judge dismissed it again, primarily on the basis that it had already been adjudicated.
On August 28, 2026, Ghassemi filed another notice of application seeking default judgment against both defendants, which was very similar, if not identical, to the August 11 notice. That matter came before Associate Judge Bilawich on September 1, 2026, at which time Ghassemi advised the court he had updated information with respect to service, specifically a letter dated August 26, 2026, from a process server offering a view that the notice of civil claim had been properly served in California. The application was again dismissed.
Ghassemi then filed a notice of application on September 1, 2026, seeking an order allowing the notice of civil claim to be alternatively served on both defendants. That application was heard September 4, 2026, by Associate Judge Vos and was dismissed.
When asked why he believed he was entitled to now seek a default judgment, Ghassemi explained that Associate Judge Vos had dismissed the application because an alternative service order was not required given that his previous service efforts were appropriate. The judge expressed skepticism, noting the default judgment application had already been rejected twice because of an inability to prove service, and advised Ghassemi that the evidence in relation to service was deficient.
The judge reviewed the court file and listened to the recording of the September 4, 2026 hearing. The judge found that Associate Judge Vos did not dismiss the application for the reasons stated by Ghassemi. Based on the positions being taken by Ghassemi, Associate Judge Vos concluded there should be no need for an order of alternative service in relation to the corporate defendant. With respect to the personal defendant, the application was dismissed because the evidence did not satisfy the court that the proposed method of alternative service would be effective. There also appeared to be an absence of evidence with respect to any prior failed attempts to personally serve Musk.
On September 15, 2026, Ghassemi filed another notice of application seeking default judgment against both defendants, again virtually identical to the earlier notices.
In analyzing the application, the judge noted that the process for obtaining a default judgment is set out in Rule 3-8, which requires an applicant to file proof of service of the notice of civil claim, proof that the defendant has failed to serve a response, a requisition endorsed by a registrar noting no response has been filed, and a draft default judgment order.
The judge found Ghassemi had not satisfied the requirements under Rule 3-8(2). The notice of civil claim had not been served on Musk personally or by way of an order for alternative service. The judge also found the information provided by Ghassemi about the September 4 hearing was not accurate, and that Associate Judge Vos did not endorse or confirm the previous service efforts as having been proper.
The judge further found it was not clear from the record whether the court had all necessary information on September 4, 2026. Having reviewed the materials in relation to service with respect to the corporate defendant, it appeared that whatever material may have been delivered in California in February 2026 failed to comply with Rule 4-4(2), as there was no endorsement on the original notice of civil claim addressing why service was permitted outside British Columbia. The judge also found that while Ghassemi argued the corporate defendant was served by way of a corporate agent in Sacramento, the supporting materials fell short of establishing that the agent had any authority to accept service of legal process on behalf of the defendant company.
The judge noted that by September 15, 2026, the application for default judgment had already been dismissed by the court on three occasions. There was no new information before the court and no basis to change the previous results.
The judge encouraged Ghassemi to seek legal advice or assistance with respect to the steps that must be taken after a notice of civil claim has been filed, particularly in terms of ensuring that service has been properly effected. The judge also noted it is burdensome to scarce court resources for fundamentally defective default judgment applications to be brought repeatedly.
The judge explained that if the defendants were aware that a plaintiff was seeking a US $300 billion judgment against them in B.C. courts, one would expect they would respond to the claim. Ghassemi speculated the defendants may have been too busy in California to pay attention to his claim. In the judge’s view, based on the evidence before the court, the more likely view is that the defendants have no knowledge of this proceeding.
The application set out in Part 1 of the plaintiff’s notice of application, filed September 15, 2026, was dismissed.
